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51. INTRODUCTION
What determines the boundaries of the firm is an important question in the theory of economic
organization, still under very lively intellectual debate (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). The
conventional distinction between firms and markets, hierarchies and prices, as the mechanism
which solve the coordination and incentive problems resulting from division of labor and exchange,
not only is still under the process of academic clarification, but it is challenged by the proliferation
of intermediate or hybrid mechanisms of governance (Williamson, 1985, 1991; Imai and Itami,
1984; Powell, 1990). When a firm needs a good or service to carry out its plans, it may buy it in the
market, develop it itself, or joint efforts with other agents, firms, in what is often called interfirm
cooperation. Now firms do not exchange in an anonymous market, neither they merger into a single
entity, so the cooperative action is often viewed as an example of “hybrids” between the market
and merger or acquisitions.
A closer look at interfirm collaborations1 reveals that they differ in the governance structure chosen
to regulate the collective actions: sometimes such structure relies more on market principles
(contracts, prices); others it involves principles often found in the internal organization of firms
(hierarchy, plans, orders). Therefore, the intellectual challenge is not only to explain why firms or
why markets to organize and govern economic transactions, but why firms choose different
governance forms for their collaborations. This paper is written with the purpose of contributing to
answer the previous question by introducing in the theoretical analysis the propositions derived
from the theory of property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995)
besides the widely used, so far, theory of transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1985,
1991). The propositions are tested using data about interfirm collaborations in which participate
Spanish firms.
The research question of this paper is not new. For example, Pisano (1989), Pisano and others
(1988), Osborn and Baugh (1990), Gulati (1995) investigate why firms choose equity exchanges
(minority interests, joint ventures) to support collaborations. More recently, Oxley (1997) further
distinguishes among bilateral and multilateral contract, within the collaborations which do not
involve equity exchanges, while Gulati and Singh (1998) separate collaborations under minority
equity interests and collaborations governed under the form of joint ventures. In all these papers,
the basic underlying framework is borrowed from Transaction Cost: as any collective action,
interfirm collaboration involves coordination and incentives needs. Contracts have limitations when
6they come to solve these needs, specially if interdependencies are intense (Gulati and Singh, 1998),
and payoff are difficult to enumerate ex-ante and verify ex-post creating appropriability hazards
(Oxley, 1997). Therefore, in certain cases, it is more efficient (it has lower transaction costs) to
substitute or complement contracts with some of the principles and rules proper of the hierarchy
(administrative controls, formal coordination units, authority).
The property rights theory has pointed out the limitations of transaction costs to explain the
boundaries of the firm with the argument that the costs of the firm (hierarchy), have not been
properly expelled out (Hart, 1995). In other words, transaction cost economics has emphasized the
costs of using the market to govern exchange, but it has not provided a rigorous explanation of the
costs of the firm as a governance structure. To our knowledge, the literature on explaining the
choice of governance forms for interfirm collaborations has ignored so far the property rights
approach and, therefore, we believe, it has ignored some basic costs of introducing hierarchical
principles in the governance of collaborations. We spell in more detail which are such costs in
section two of the paper, but to motivate the exposition let us consider the case of joint ventures.
One of the basic predictions of the property rights model is that joint ownership (each party has
veto power on how to allocate the assets) is inefficient when either separate ownership (each party
is the owner of some assets) or single ownership (all assets belong to one party) are also feasible.
However, a joint venture with two parties, each holding 50 per cent of the shares, is a widely
diffused form of joint ownership in interfirm collaborations. To reconcile the empirical evidence
with the theoretical prediction is quite important, if we take into account the recognition given by
the academic profession to the property rights approach2, and the diffusion of balanced joint
venture3.
Section two of the paper presents the theoretical model and postulates the hypothesis to be tested.
Besides extending transaction cost to properly account for the “costs of ownership”, the paper
combines results from the theory of implicit contracts and the consideration of “market power”
interests to expand the factors that determine the choice of the governance form. Section three
contents the description of the data, the variables, the methodologies used to test the hypothesis
(ordered logit and multinomial logit models), and the empirical results. The paper closes with
discussion of the results and conclusions.
72. THEORETICAL MODELS
2.1. Transaction cost and property rights
The basic proposition of transaction costs economics establishes that “transactions which differ in
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures which differ in their costs and competencies
in a discriminatory way” (Williamson, 1991, p. 277). The application of transaction cost theory to
explain the governance form in inter-firms collaborations requires to properly identify the relevant
attributes involved in the transaction, the alternative governance forms considered and the costs
functions resulting from using a governance form in each transaction.
The transaction
In this paper, the unit of analysis (transaction) is what we label as “interfirm collaboration”, defined
as any non transitory relation among independent companies which involves exchange and/or
sharing of resources and capabilities to obtain mutually beneficial outcomes. With this definition,
we identify transactions where there are at least two firms and both remain legally independent
entities  (so the transaction does not take place within a single firm, as would be the case if it was
the result of a merger, acquisition or internal development). Also we identify transactions where the
relation among the participating firms goes beyond an anonymous spot exchange of goods or
service at a market predetermined price (so even that the transaction takes place in the domain of
the market it involves long term relations with identifiable parties). In some cases the collaboration
involves exchange of an already existing good or service in a long-term non-spot basis. In others,
collaborating firms share resources to carry out ex-novo activities either creating at the same time a
new entity (firm) or without creating it.
The transaction attribute listed as determinants of the cost of governance, differ across the authors.
Williamson (1985) selected three: the nature of the involved assets, general or specific; the
available information, uncertainty and symmetry; the frequency under which the transaction takes
place. Milgrom and Roberts (1992), on the other hand, indicate five potentially relevant attributes:
the specificity of investments, frequency and duration between consecutive transactions;
complexity and uncertainty about possible actions in the future; difficulty of measuring the
performance along the transaction; interrelations among transaction and/or persons involved.
In the present paper we shall refer to the level of “transaction complexity”, assumed to be an
increasing function of interdependencies among transacting units, level of asset specificity,
uncertainty about future contingencies and difficulties of measuring performance. As in others
8research papers, the attributes considered as sources of complexity are not directly observable, and
they will have to be approximate by variables that can be observed.
The governance forms
Imai and Itami (1984) made the important distinction between where transactions take place, in the
market or within firms, and the principles used to govern them, organization principles or market
principles. Interfirm collaboration takes place in the domain of the market, as the two or more firms
involved remain independent, but sometimes they rely mostly on organization principals, such as
hierarchy, administrative control, and formal coordination units. Most of the previous works on the
governance of collaborations have made the distinction between governance forms that rely on
contracts and forms that rely on hierarchical controls. From an empirical perspective, contracts are
further divided in unilateral or bilateral exchange (Oxley, 1997). Within the hierarchy, differences
in degree have been attributed to equity (minority) exchange, and to the creation of a new
independent firm -joint venture- (Gulati and Singh, 1998).
Implicit in the notion of hierarchy there is the idea of authority and fiat (Williamson, 1991). The
literature on interfirm collaboration has extensively described how joint ventures, for example,
imply the introduction of hierarchical principals, compared with the case of contracts. However, the
implications in terms of allocating ownership rights have been ignored. This is why we extend the
choice of governance to consider the theory of property rights, introduced in Grossman and Hart
(1986) and summarized in detail in Hart (1995).
Agents participating in exchange and/or production are often forced to rely on incomplete
contracts. This is due to the fact that when the contract is written down it is impossible or extremely
costly to anticipate all future contingencies, or such contingencies will be unverifiable by third
parties (mainly the courts) when they actually occur. Therefore, incomplete contracts are
ambiguous about what will happen in certain circumstances, so a mechanism has to be designed to
resolve such ambiguity. Presumably, a new bargaining process will be initiated, but even in this
situation it has to be anticipated what will happen in case of disagreement.
The property rights theory associates the actual resolution of the incomplete contracts with the
allocation of “residual decision rights”. To hold such rights over the non-human assets of the
transaction means to have the rights to decide on any non-anticipated contingency. In this regard, to
be the “owner” of an asset is to hold the residual decision rights on the asset. Ownership is an
institution to allocate residual decision rights. In a world of complete contracts, where everything is
predetermined ex-ante, ownership is irrelevant. But when contracts are incomplete and there are
9specificities in the transaction, the allocation of decision rights (ownership) matters in terms of
incentives to invest more or less in the specific assets, before the transaction takes place.
In the property rights framework, governance forms differ according to how residual decision rights
are allocated. When assets in both sides of the transaction belong to one of the parties we refer to
single ownership because the decision rights are concentrated in only one part. This is the situation
created when two previously legally independent firms merger into a single one. If each of the two
or more transacting parties has veto power on the use of the assets, the governance is known as
joint ownership; a 50 – 50 equity joint venture between two firms will be a form of joint ownership.
If the residual decision rights are allocated to a third party not directly involved in the transaction,
as it would be the case in collaboration where some third party arbitration is contemplated in the
contract to resolve disputes, the governance form is known as trilateral governance. Finally,
ownership of the assets can be distributed among transacting parties; separated ownership.
A typology.
Borrowing from transaction costs economics and from the theory of property rights, the governance
forms available for exchange and production can be described as follows; see Figure 1
Spot Classical Contracting corresponds to pure market exchange where prices are the main (and
sufficient) information to adjust resource allocation decision in an efficient way. Buyers and sellers
can substitute each other at no cost and therefore the identity of the transacting parties is irrelevant
(anonymity). Finally, the  “quid” and the “quo” of the exchange occur at the same time, so
exchange only takes place when there is mutual compliance.
Long Term Classical Contract is a governance form closer to the pure market governance as it
continues to rely on prices to guide adjustments and coordinate decisions. Contracts are fairly
standardized and complete but the repeated and long-term perspective of the transaction makes
relevant the identity of the parties. To substitute a partner has an important cost (at least you have
the search costs, trying to find the best new partner). A time distance will generally exist between
the “quid” and the “quo” of the transaction, and therefore the formal and explicit contract plays a
more significant role in regulating the transaction.
Neoclassical Contracting is a governance form where contracts provide a framework under which
production or exchange will take place, and some degree of incompleteness and ambiguity is
acknowledged. The ownership of the assets is separated among the transacting parties, as in the
previous two cases, but the contract may include safeguards for the transacting parties in the form
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of information disclosure clauses, penalties for certain behavior, explicit dispute resolution
mechanisms (arbitration), etc4.
The term Indirect Ownership is used to refer to situations where the ownership of the assets in the
collaboration (transaction) is the result of holding ownership rights over the assets of the
collaborating firms themselves. The clearest example is minority equity interest through cross-
shareholdings. Depending upon the size of the equity holdings and the statutory or contracted
provisions, the holder of the minority interest will have more or less influence on the decision
process affecting the control and management of the collaboration. For example, collaborating
firms may also exchange seats in their respective boards of directors.
Joint Ownership, as indicated above, implies that the holder of the decision rights has individual
veto power on the use of the assets involved in the collaboration. Such assets are clearly segregated
and placed in a legally separated entity where they are administrated under this ownership
condition. A joint venture with 50 – 50 equity holdings of the two parties is a clear example of joint
ownership, although the veto condition can also be instrumented contractually, independently of
equity holdings.
The fact that a new firm is created suggests that the joint venture substitute the market by the
hierarchy. Notice, however, that the governance form differs from the pure hierarchy (hierarchical
governance) because in the later assets in both sides of the transaction are owned by a single party;
Single Ownership. The previous literature on inter-firm collaboration has emphasized the use of
administrative and hierarchical control when collaboration is organized in the form of the joint
venture, recalling that in fact a new firm is created. But the distinction between single and joint
ownership has been ignored. Moreover, a joint venture where one party has more than 50 per cent
of equity and, consequently, has effective control (assuming one share one vote), would have to be
considered single ownership and a departure from a proper interfirm collaboration.
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Figure 1. Typology of Governance Forms
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Transaction costs and the choice of the governance form
Firms interested in certain resource or activity can rely on market exchange, internal development
or collaboration with other firms to satisfy their needs. In this respect, inter-firm collaboration can
be placed in the domain of market relations but with the use of strong organization principles as the
relation goes beyond anonymous spot exchange at a predetermined price. From the perspective of
the governance, collaborations are examples of hybrids, in the terminology of Williamson (1991),
since they share elements of the two pure governance forms, markets and hierarchy.
The empirical and theoretical work on inter-firm collaboration has not focused so much on the
choice of the hybrid from in front of the market and/or internal development alternatives, but rather
on explaining the variations in the forms of governance observed in the broad field of
collaborations, some closer to market exchange, some closer to vertical integration (hierarchy)5.
Besides technical or productive efficiency, firms involved in collaborations look after
organizational efficiency, determined by how the coordination and incentive problems of the
collective action are effectively solved. In this respect, transaction costs may be viewed as the
economic value of the resources employed in solving such coordination and incentive problems,
plus the opportunity loss, i.e. the net wealth which could be achieved under the ideal conditions
where coordination and incentive problems would be automatically solved (fiction world of perfect
competitive markets), and the wealth obtained with the solution actually in place.
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Each governance form implies alternative ways of solving the coordination and incentive problems,
different amounts of explicit resources employed in such solution, and different residual or
opportunity losses. The contribution of transaction costs economics has been to identify attributes
of each transaction and dimensions of the different governance forms, such that a reduced cost
function can be identified relating transaction costs and attributes of the transaction, for each
possible governance forms. The application of transaction cost economics to interfirm collaboration
has followed the same approach.
The transaction complexity in interfirm collaborations determines the coordination needs and the
nature of the incentive problems. In general, more complex transactions imply also more
transaction costs, but the evolution and nature of such costs will differ from one governance form
to the other and therefore a most efficient form can be selected.
Long Term Classical contracting relies mostly in market mechanisms to govern transactions. This
means that prices help to solve coordinating problems and that contracts are fairly complete.
Moreover, “exit” (and substitution among sellers and buyers) is an effective protection against ex-
post opportunism. All these conditions will be satisfied as the intensity of interdependencies is low,
the resources involved are fairly general and ex-ante uncertainty about future contingencies is
limited. In other words, we expect theses governance forms to dominate in the lower levels of
transaction complexity.
In Neoclassical contracting, contracts are a frame of reference to which the parties appeals when
there are conflicts of interest, but the actual relation contemplates mutual adaptation to small
perturbation and some joint coordination efforts. The tolerances for adjustments as contingencies
arise are, however, small and this implies that contracts are fairly complete or, in other words,
uncertainty is in general relatively low. The ownership of the assets is kept separated among the
transacting parties so individual incentives are preserved. This governance form can handle more
resources specificities than classical contracting because uncertainty is low and formal explicit
contracts fairly detailed can be written.
As uncertainty increases and contracts have to be necessarily more incomplete, under the presence
of resources specificities which create bilateral relationships, contracts (and exit) can not longer
protect efficiently against ex-post bargaining and opportunism (Oxley, 1997). Some “voice”
mechanism is needed to induce the parties to participate in the transaction. Equity interests include
voice rights and, at the same time, rights over residual income, so some alignment between
individual and collective interests is also achieved. The indirect ownership of cross-shareholdings
provides additional safeguards for the interests of the transacting parties and with them the
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likelihood of more complex collaborations being completed increases. When besides uncertainty
and resources specificities the collective action involves intense interdependencies and high
coordination needs, equity interest should be complemented with operational and administrative
devices which perform the coordinating function. It is assumed that the creation of a new firm, joint
venture, will facilitate coordination, as it will have at its disposal the elements proper of
hierarchical governance (Kogut, 1988; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Gulati and Singh, 1998).
Therefore, equity interests, including joint ventures, are likely to be more effective as governance
forms when collaborations are highly complex in terms of uncertainty, resources specificities,
interdependencies,… so incentive problems and coordination needs are highly severe. This leaves
room for neoclassical contracting at intermediate levels of complexity.
The costs of ownership
The property rights literature has criticized transaction cost economics with the argument that it has
properly described the benefits of ownership, but it has largely ignored the costs. References to cost
of bureaucracy, weakening of individual incentives, hazards of internal politicking…, to explain the
limits to the expansion of the hierarchy (firm) are ambiguous and difficult to make operative in
empirical analysis. We believe that this criticism is also pertinent for the literature on inter-firm
collaboration, where the advantages of hierarchical controls to solve coordination needs (Gulati and
Singh, 1998) and to protect from appropriation hazards (Oxley, 1997), have been spelled out with
detail, but the costs are practically ignored.
When it comes to explain the boundaries between firms and markets, the property rights approach
takes ownership of non-human assets under common ownership. Decisions about asset ownership
and firm boundaries are important because control over assets gives the owner bargaining power
when unforeseen or uncovered circumstances force parties to negotiate how their relationship
should be continued (so we are in a world of incomplete contracts and resources specificities that
make the exit option unattractive).
Ownership of human capital is not transferable. The efficiency implications of ownership of non-
human assets have been evaluated in terms of its effects on the ex-ante investment decisions in
relation to specific human capital. In the Grossman-Hart-Moore world, the human capital of all
transacting parties is complementary and the same complementarily occurs between human and
non-human capital. When ownership of a non human assets is transferred from one party to the
other, the marginal incentives to invest in human capital are affected in a different way: it increases
for those receiving more assets and it decreases for those who transfer them. No general solution
can be derived; sometimes is more efficient to keep ownership of non human assets separated in the
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different transacting parties, others is efficient to concentrate them in one side of the transaction
(the seller or the buyer). But what the theory finds is that neither joint ownership or third party
ownership is efficient when other options are available (Hart, 1995, Chapter 3).
Further extensions of the basic model have modified these results:
i) If specific investment before the transaction is incorporated into ownership transferable
physical capital, then joint ownership may be more efficient than single ownership (Hart,
1995, p. 68).
ii) Second, if human capital and non-human capital are substitutes rather than complements,
then third part ownership may be efficient (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
iii) Third, reputation in a context of repeated transactions, may make joint ownership efficient
in the basic model (Halonen, 1994; Baker et al., 1997). A firm does not want to loose its
reputation due to the effects on the net value of the future benefits.
The conclusions above have several implications for the analysis of inter-firm collaborations,
besides the general point of paying more attention to the costs of ownership. First, it is difficult to
explain or justify the selection of ownership forms different from single ownership without
considering explicitly this alternative. In other words, the choice to be explained should be among
contracts and all forms of ownership. Second, a more detailed analysis of the relationship between
human and non-human assets is clearly pertinent. Third, as 50 – 50 equity joint ventures is a
common form of collaboration and the theory predicts that such form of joint ownership is
inefficient, some work is needed to reconcile the evidence with this prediction.
Cost functions and hypotheses
Following Williamson (1991), the arguments from Transaction Costs outlined above will be
condensed in reduced form cost functions, which will be helpful to formulate the hypotheses to be
tested.
Let x be a continuos variable which measures the complexity of the transaction, and let L (x), N
(x), and H (x) be the cost function which determine the transaction costs of governing transaction
complexity x through Long Term Classical contracts, with Neoclassical contracts and with
Hierarchical principles, respectively. From conventional transaction cost analysis, the following
properties are assumed:
L(0) < N(0) < H(0) (1)
L’x > N’x > H’x (2)
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Condition (1) refers to the relation among transaction costs at low level of transaction complexity.
The lower costs of Long Term Classical contract come from the “public good” nature of markets
when it comes to provide information (prices) and individual incentives (invisible hand). Low
complexity implies that the attributes of the transaction are such that prices are sufficient statistics
to guide adjustment and coordination, and individual incentives are compatible with global
efficiency. At the other extreme, when the substitution of contracts is associated with the
introduction of administrative and hierarchical controls, as it is the case in the literature of inter-
firm collaboration, such controls imply the use of resources to perform coordination, supervise
activities and measure inputs or outputs (visible hand). Such resources have a cost, which is
reflected in the higher value of H (0), compared with L (0). We assume that Neoclassical
contracting has fixed set up costs in between Long Term Classic and Hierarchy. This form of
contract does not rely on hierarchical principles to govern the transaction, so it saves costs with
respect to Hierarchy.  But the contract is less standardized, should cover more contingencies, and
due to the difficulty to foresee all of them, more resources should be invested in writing and
monitoring the contract.
Condition (2) establishes and ordering of the marginal transaction costs with respect to the
complexity of the transaction6. The costs of using Classical contracts increase faster than the costs
of Hierarchy as uncertainty and resource specificity, for example, create bilateral dependencies and
risks of rent expropriation. The resources put up ex-ante to complement the market and the explicit
contract, save now on incremental transaction costs. This case may be extended to the solution of
coordination needs when interdependencies are high. Once again, Neoclassical contracts are
attributed marginal transaction costs in between the costs of the other two forms.
Property (1) and (2) are translated into the graphical representation of Figure 27. Up the level of
complexity x1
*, the most efficient governance form (lower total transaction cost) is Long Term
Classical contracting; the higher marginal costs are compensated by their lower fixed costs. Beyond
x1
* and up to x2
* Neoclassical contracting has the lowest transaction costs. Finally, for higher
complexity levels (beyond x2
*), Hierarchy would be preferred (lowest costs).
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Figure 2. Relationship between Governance Costs and Transaction Complexity.
Governance Costs
       
1
*
X 2
*
X
Government through Government through
Long Term Classical Contract Hierarchy
Government through
Neoclassical Contract
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1991).
Figure 2, together with the attributes of the Transaction which have been recognized as sources of
complexity, allow us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H1a: There exist two ordered complexity thresholds in inter-firm collaborations, which
determine the respective choice of Long Term Classical contracting, Neoclassical contracting
and Hierarchical arrangements.
H1b: Complexity is positively associated with coordination needs, as interdependencies
increase, and also with incentive problems, information asymmetries, resource specificity and
measurement cost.
So far, no consideration is made of the costs of ownership, as the substitution of contracts by
hierarchy has only considered the introduction of administrative and operational mechanisms for
coordination and control. As it has been mentioned above, to go from “contracts” to “firms”
implies to change the allocation of ownership rights on non-human assets and this has implications
for efficiency.
Long-Term Classical Contract
Neoclassical Contract
Hierarchy
Transaction Complexity
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Moreover, joint ownership is only efficient, compared with all ownership alternatives, under
special conditions. So the property H’x < N’x no longer holds in general: separated ownership of
physical assets, which is the case in Neoclassical contracting, may be more efficient in terms of ex-
ante incentives to invest in assets specific to the transaction, than joint ownership.
From the property rights perspective, then, hierarchy may be less attractive than contracts at high
levels of complexity (uncertainty and resource specificities), especially when the specific assets are
human capital not incorporated into physical capital in the process of the transaction.
H2: When there are ex-ante investments in human capital embodied on the persons making
the investment, inter-firm collaborations which imply joint ownership of the non human
assets are less likely than those which keep ownership of assets separated among the
collaborating parties.
Consequently, in the case of joint ventures, we may have to weight the potential benefits of
introducing administrative systems, which help to solve coordination needs, with the direct costs of
these systems AND with the indirect costs due to the choice of an inefficient governance form from
the point of view of the allocation of ownership rights.
2.2. Collusion opportunities and implicit contracts as determinants of the firms boundaries
Collusion interests
Inter-firm collaborations may not only respond to efficiency considerations aimed to lower
production and transaction costs, but to facilitate coordination among firms in the product market
and alleviate competitive pressures.
If firms are rivals in the product market the costs and benefits of collaboration are more difficult to
evaluate since now they may interfere with the competitive process. Veugelers and Kesteloot
(1996) reach this conclusion for firms collaborating in R&D activities. Reynolds and Snapp (1986),
on the other hand, show that firms in the same product market may reduce the intensity of
competition and obtain profits closer to the monopoly solution by creating equity linkages among
them (cross-shareholding and joint ventures). The search of more market power and the facilitate of
collusive practices may then be additional reasons why firms collaborate.
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H3: For a given level of transaction complexity, inter-firm collaborations with equity linkages
are more likely when there are opportunities to attenuate product market competition among
collaborating firms.
Implicit contracts
The economic analysis of inter-firm collaborations as a part of the broader question of explaining
the boundaries of the firm (market, integration, hybrids) has considered so far the selection among
explicit contracts (more or less complete) to regulate the transactions. However, collaborating
parties may also rely on implicit contracts, i.e. contracts that are sustained by mutual promises of
good faith, non-opportunistic behavior and priority of collective interest over individual ones.
Transacting parties are willing to participate in transactions governed by implicit contracts because
there are savings in costs compared with the use of explicit contracts sustained by the courts and
legal procedures, and because each one believes that the other parties will comply with the
promises of not acting opportunistically. The reduction in costs is obvious if we take into account
that contracts do not have to be written down and that no ex-post verification by third part will be
implemented (since there is no formal contract, verification is excluded as a possibility).
The credibility of promises of “good behavior” will be sustained by the presence of social norms,
Coleman (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and by the egoistic interest of preserving a good
reputation. If one party abuses of the trust of the other, who accepted to transact under the
governance of an implicit contract, it may be broken a social norm which establishes what are
considered the desirable patterns of behavior from the point of view of the collectivity. Social
pressures in the form of sentiments of “guilt” and/or “shame” make promises credible as parties
know that those making the promises will try to avoid such social sanctions.
Reputation helps to sustain implicit contracts, as persons build up believes about future behavior of
the others based upon observed behavior in the past (Kreps, 1990). If one agent has abused of the
trust of the others in the past, it is expected that no one will want to be involved in implicit
contracts with such agent in the future. The potential short-term benefit of the abuse may be offset
by the future losses, as the abuser will not be able to participate of the advantages of implicit
contracts. In fact, some transactions may generate so high transaction costs if they rely on explicit
contracts that they can only be viable if implicit contracts are feasible. Therefore, the access to such
transactions will be restricted to those whose reputation induces in others believes of good faith in
their behavior.
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In the inter-firm collaboration literature, implicit contracts can be considered substitutes of explicit
contract provisions in Neoclassical contracting, and/or substitutes of voice and other safeguard
mechanisms against opportunistic behavior when Hierarchies substitute contracts. Therefore, for a
given level of transaction complexity it is expected to observe less hierarchical governance
structures in collaborations where implicit contracts are feasible than in those where they are not
(Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997).
H4a: For a given level of transaction complexity, the likelihood of contractual safeguards and
hierarchical controls in inter-firm collaboration is lower when collaborations are carried
forward under conditions which favor social norms and reputation effects, as sustainable of
implicit contracts.
Notice, however, that, as indicated above, the property rights theory finds complementarities
between implicit contracts and some forms of hierarchical governance structures considered in
inter-firm collaborations, such as joint ventures, as a case of joint ownership. Recall that the
efficiency of joint ownership as a form of governance is recovered when reputation considerations
are introduced into the analysis. The reason is that, with joint ownership, it is possible to lower the
parties payoffs in the case of contract abuse and, consequently, increase the future losses which are
compared with short-term benefits of defecting; Halonen (1994).
H4b: The likelihood of joint ownership in inter-firm collaborations with person-embodied
specific human capital increases under conditions that favor reputation effects.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The data used in this work come from a detailed study of the inter-firm collaborations announced in
Spanish leading economic newspapers and magazines during the three-year period of 1990 till
1992. The condition for an announcement to be included in the database was that at least one of the
participating firms had to be from Spain. When possible, the description of the collaboration and of
the selected governance structure was completed with information coming from different sources.
Finally, a total of 1148 evidences of collaborations were identified and completely described with
the variables listed below.
Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the governance form of the collaboration. The coding of this variable
proceeds as follows:
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i) Long Term Classical Contract = 0, when the collaboration is an Exchange Agreement
ii) Neoclassical Contract = 1, when the collaboration is an Alliance
iii) Hierarchy = 2, when the collaboration involve a Cross-Shareholding or a Joint Venture.
An interfirm collaboration is identified as an Exchange Agreement when it involves the supply of a
product, service or  know-how from one firm to the other in a recurrent basis; when firms share a
given facility for marketing, distribution or after sale services; technology licensing; subcontracting
of manufacture or R&D.
For example, since 1995 Freixenet, the Spanish firm leader of the sparkling wine market, is
collaborating with the German distributor Eckes. The relation is based on a distribution contract
among both firms. The time period that was initially established were three years (at the end of this
period both firms could maintain the relation if they were interested in). The contract clauses
establish the supply of the product (specifying all their characteristics) and some aspects of the
marketing program. For example, Eckes must sell a minimum of bottles. If they could not do it,
Freixenet would be able to cancel the contract, compensating Eckes with an amount equivalent to
one-year profits8.
Collaboration is classified as an Alli ce when firms set up a project that implies the production or
development of a non-existing product or service. No new legally independent entity is created and
the project may have a limited or open time horizon. For example, Telmex, a Mexican firm, and
Telefónica developed a project with the purpose of finally creating a digital system operated
through a submarine cable of optic fiber. No time limit was established in the contract.
The exchange of minority interest, Cro s-Shareholdings, and the creation of new entities, Joint
ventures, are the collaborations more easy to identify and properly separate from Alliances and
Exchange Agreements. For example, Banco de Santander and Royal Bank of Scotland exchanged
equity (the former bought 9.9 per cent of shares of the later and Bank of Scotland bought 4.9 per
cent of Banco Santander) to do joint investments in Europe and exchange experience and
technology. On the other hand, Acerinox, a Spanish company, and Armco, a US firm, jointly
created the firm North American Stainless, an example of joint venture.
The codification of the variables does not explicitly recognize the different forms of ownership.
However notice that Exchange Agreements and Alliances are cases of Separ t  Ownership as
collaborating firms control the residual decisions right, if any, of the physical assets involved in the
collaboration. Cross-shareholdings and Joint ventures, on the other hand, are treated initially as
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forms of Joint Ownership. Ideally, it would be of interest to know in which cases the parties have
individual veto power on the assets combined in the collaboration and/or the actual shares hold for
each of them in the joint venture, but such information was not available. Notice, however, that
Geringer and Herbert (1989) and Killing (1983) report empirical evidence on the fact that, in
general, the creation of a joint venture incorporates the right of veto over strategic decisions by the
partners. We rely on this evidence to assume that this veto power is present in most of the joint
ventures of our sample, although this evidence has not been contrasted. To see the robustness of the
results to this assumption some sensitivity analysis will be performed, for example, excluding
cross-shareholdings as a form of joint ownership.
Explanatory variables
In this paper we consider that it is possible to assign a more or less degree of complexity to the
observed transaction depending upon the uncertainty, the assets specificity, interdependencies,
number of parties, measurement problems, etc. The assumption postulates that more complex
transactions present higher values in these underlying attributes.
Most often, empirical data do not allow measuring directly the theoretically postulated attributes;
therefore, we have to manage with the appropriate proxies. In our particular case, the attributes of
the transaction actually observed are: the number of collaborating parties; whether there are
multiple activities contemplated in the transaction or only a single one; whether the collaboration
involves R&D activities or not; whether the collaboration had to do with the expansion in the same
product-market where the firms are already active or, to the contrary, involves diversification into
new ones. We now relate these observable variable attributes with the sources of complexity.
The number of independent parties involved in the transaction will affect the complexity of such
transaction as the number of potential interactions, and therefore interdependencies among them,
will increase with such number. So, the number of partners is considered to have positive
influences on the coordination needs. The problems of measuring individual contributions to the
collective action, which facilitate free riding behavior (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), will also likely
increase.
As the number of activities to be performed within the inter-firm collaboration increases, it is likely
that the number of interdependencies will also increase. Collaborations with multiple activities
(coded with 1) as compared with those with a single activity (0), have more coordination needs.
Furthermore, the likely interrelations among them will make more difficult to spell out the
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contributions and pay-off for each partner and, therefore, it will increase the risks of expropriation,
compared with those when only one activity is performed. Therefore it is possible to associate this
observed attribute with higher degrees of transaction complexity.
The two other attributes affecting the complexity of the transaction are the realization of technology
and R&D related activities (1), compared with the absence of such activities (0), and whether the
purpose of the collaboration is to diversify into new product-market (1), compared with expansion
in the current ones (0).
The presence of R&D related activities in the collaboration suggest that the transaction involve
production and transfer of knowledge, which is difficult to protect with contracts. In this situation,
transaction complexity increases because (Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1985):
i) For fixing a price it is necessary to know the product, but once the knowledge is acquired
there is no point in paying the price.
ii) The knowledge may be non-codified and often ex-ante uncertain, so the outcomes of the
transaction are difficult to enumerate and verify.
iii) The generation of knowledge often involves sunk costs and therefore specific resources to
the transaction.
Finally, it will be assumed that innovation through R&D activities is likely to have more person
embodied human capital than other activities. Innovation is highly labor intensive and the costs
incurred on it are widely recognized as sunk costs (Stiglitz, 1987).
Inter-firm collaborations which imply diversification into new products and markets will be
associated with more transaction complexity than those which only expand current products-
markets of the parties, because it is expected higher uncertainty in the former than in the later.
Expansion will allow the transacting parties to draw from previous experiences at the time of
enumerating possible contingencies to take place along the transaction. Diversification, on the other
hand, implies newness and less potential for anticipating disrupting events and for evaluating their
likelihood of occurrence.
The conditions that favor social pressure and reputation effects as sustainable of implicit contracts,
are proxies by the variables nationality of the collaborating part and location of the activities to be
carried out. Social norms are more likely in culturally homogeneous social communities. Moreover,
geographical proximity will facilitate the observation of the behavior of the partners and check
whether such behavior is consistent or not with the premises. Observation of the behavior, or at
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least, of the consequences of it, is necessary to apply social sanctions such as shame, and to start
the application of economic penalties by excluding the deviating part from future collaborations.
The partner nationality variable is divided in five categories: Spanish, European Union, United
States, Japan and Other countries. Implicit contracts are expected to be more viable when partners
are Spanish or European (cultural proximity). It may also be argued that higher socio-cultural
distance among collaborating partners may difficult collaborations that involve strong interpersonal
relations. So, instead of introducing more hierarchical controls, firms choose to rely on more
standardized contracts such as licensing. So, socio-cultural distance may favor both, long-term
contracts and hierarchies.
Collusion opportunities are proxied by a variable that refers to the nature of the relations among
collaborating firms. A distinction is made between horizontal (1) and vertical (0) relation. In the
first case, collaborating firms belong to the same stage of the industry’s value chain and therefore
are likely to compete in the same market. Vertical relations occur when firms belong to consecutive
stages of the value chain. The search of market power, as a possible objective of some form of
equity linkages among firms, can be expected under horizontal relations.
Information is also available on the economic sector where the collaboration takes place.
Manufacturing, Construction and Service sectors are widely represented. It is acknowledge that
patent protection differ across industries (Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998), so the legal system
will protect in a different degree the interests of the parts depending upon the economic sector
where the collaboration is developed. Furthermore, according to Harrigan (1985) rapidly changing
technological development induces the formation of somewhat more informal forms of
collaboration such as non-equity agreements. As industries become mature, more formal modes of
collaboration such as joint ventures become the preferred ones. So, in choosing particular modes of
collaboration, the level of technological sophistication of industries plays an important role
(Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996, p. 280). Osborn and Baughn’s (1990) survey suggest that
technological stability of industrial sectors is a crucial factor in explaining different patterns of
equity and non-equity partnerships. The estimation will control for sector effects including sector
dummies as explanatory variables.
Finally, two time dummies, one for the year 1990 and other for the year 1991 (so the omitted year
is 1992), are included as control variables to account for possible macroeconomic factors common
to all collaborating firms in a given year. Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables used in the
analysis and provides basic descriptive statistics for each of them.
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Insert Table 1.
Overall, 26 per cent of the collaborations are Exchange Agreements, 32 per cent Alliances and 41
per cent involve equity interests (Cross-shareholdings and joint ventures). The dominant form of
collaboration has the following attributes: it involves activities different from R&D, it is created
with the purpose of market expansion, the partner is from outside from Spain, the collaboration
takes place in a manufacturing sector and the firms involved have an horizontal relation.
Methodology
To test the hypotheses we shall use two methodologies: ordered logit and multinomial logit choice
models.
Let xi be the level of complexity of collaboration i where:
Xi = byi + ei (3)
The vector yi includes all the variables (proxies) considered as sources of complexity (together with
possible control terms); the vector b includes the weights attached to each source of complexity;
and ei is the error term.
The theoretical model, synthesized in conditions (1) and (2), assumes that the unobservable
variable xi determines the choice of one of the ordered governance forms as it falls in one of the
following discrete intervals:
i) If xi < m0, Long Term Contract (=0) is selected
ii) If  m0 < xi < m1, Neoclassical Contract (=1) is selected
iii) If  m1< xi, Hierarchy (=2) is selected (4)
The ordered logit statistical analysis estimates the vector of parameters b taking in o account the
observed characteristics of the collaboration yi and the mapping in (4). It assumes that the
underlying probability distribution of ei is normal.
Acceptance of hypothesis 1 requires that the thresholds levels m0 and m1, with m0 < m1, are
confirmed by the statistical estimation and that the variables considered associated with complexity
do in fact have a b coefficient positive and significant.
Our model derives the thresholds m0 andm1 assuming properties (1) and (2) of the underlying and
unobservable cost functions. The multinomial logit choice model provides an statistical
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methodology which is based upon the comparison of the utilities (negative costs), associated with
each of the alternative governance forms, given a vector of transaction’s characteristics. In
probabilistic form, the model is expressed as follows:
Pij = P(G = j / yi) = e 
ajyi / Sk eakyi
Where Pij is the probability that collaboration i is governed by structure j, j = 0, 1, 2; aj is a vector
of coefficients which determine the impact of the explanatory variables on the probability that each
of the governance forms will be selected. The variation of  j acr ss governance forms is consistent
with the assumption that the cost functions (utilities) are different for each of them, see Figure 2.
To estimate the coefficient aj the utility of one of the alternatives is used as normalization value. In
our case, the alternative will be the Long Term Classical contracting. Therefore, the parameters of
the other alternatives have to be interpreted in reference to the omitted one. A particular value of
one estimated coefficient alj, indicates the extent to which the attribute l of the transaction
contributes to the utility of governance alternative j, beyond the contribution that this attribute
would have in determining the utility of the base option, Long Term Classical contracting.
The existence of the thresholds of complexity postulated in hypothesis 1 is the result of increasing
fixed costs and decreasing marginal costs with respect to complexity as governance forms
approximate the hierarchy. If the base option to compare with is the Long Term Classical
contracting, then we should expect that the likelihood of choosing other governance forms different
from the base option at lower levels of transaction complexity decreases as such governance forms
are closer to the hierarchy. At the same time, the likelihood of choosing an alternative governance
form compared with that of choosing the base option, as complexity increases  should increase
more intensively as more hierarchical is the alternative form. Therefore, we expect a1 < a2.
The multinomial logit choice model allows for another way to test H1a, and also will be the
methodology used to test the other hypotheses as they are formulated in terms of comparisons of
likelihood values.
4. RESULTS
The first estimation corresponds to the ordered logit model; Table 2. The statistical package
LIMDEP 5 used for such estimation, fixes a threshold value of m0 = 0, and therefore, in Table 2
only the estimated value of m1, the second threshold, is reported.
26
As established in the hypothesis H1a, the estimated value of m1 is positive and statistically
significant at 1 per cent level. Therefore, the prediction that there will be complexity thresholds that
will determine the switch from one governance form to the other in interfirm collaborations, can
not be rejected from our data. When the complexity index is below zero, captured basically by the
constant term given our definition of the variables, then the Long Term Classical contract is the
governance form most likely to be selected; at intermediate levels of complexity, between 0 and
2.54 in the scale of complexity, the most likely governance form is Neoclassical contracting.
Finally, beyond 2.54, the governance form with highest likelihood involves some form of
hierarchical control.
Insert Table 2
Table 2 also confirms our hypothesis H1b in the sense that the complexity index increases with
interdependencies, uncertainty, resources specificities and measurement problems, since we obtain
positive coefficients for the proxy variables used to measure these attributes of the transaction,
number of partners, number of activities performed, the presence of R&D activities and the
purpose, expansion or diversification, of the collaboration. The highest estimated coefficients are
for the variable “Multiple” and “Diversification”, which means, for example, that those
collaborations to perform multiple activities imply a relatively high level of complexity compared
with those which only perform one activity, and consequently they also have higher likelihood of
incorporating hierarchical controls. On the other hand, the coefficient of “Number of Partners” is
not statistically significant, so the variable does not seem to significantly affect the level of
complexity, according to our data9.
The ordered logit model is estimated with the rest of the variables that the theory points out as
potentially affecting the choice of the governance form, second column of Table 2. The inclusion of
these variable is only for control purposes, as their effects will be tested with the multinomial logit
model. Notice, however, that these variables have in some case statistically significant coefficients
and a positive sign on it would indicate that, for a given level of complexity, higher values of the
variable increase the likelihood of choosing a more hierarchical governance form. This happens, for
example, when collaborating firms have an horizontal relation, and when the partner comes from
another European country. On the other hand, the likelihood of hierarchical forms decreases
relatively in Energy and General Services.
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An alternative way of testing hypothesis 1 is by estimating the intercepts and slopes of the
likelihood functions from the multinomial logit model. As indicated in the theory section, the
relative slopes of these functions, with respect to the base case of comparison, Long Term Classical
Contract in our formulation, capture the relatives slopes, in an inverse way, of the governance cost
functions represented in Figure 2. On the other hand, the intercept captures the relative fixed cost.
Also remarkable is that the multinomial logit allows for more flexibility in the estimation (it does
not assume monotonicity on the effects of each variable on the probability of choice as the ordered
logit does), and it is the methodology which will allow us to test the rest of the propositions.
Table 3 reports the results of the multinomial logit model. First, notice that overall, the results are
consistent with the thresholds values detected by the ordered logit model: the estimated constant is
negative and has higher absolute value as one moves towards governance with formal controls, -2.4
for Neoclassical Contracts and –4.22 for hierarchical (both significantly different from zero and
4.22 > 2.4, t value of 1.9). These values would be consistent with the relation of fixed costs
presented in Figure 1, costs which are the relevant for determining the preference for Long Term
Contracts at low levels of transaction complexity. So at low levels of complexity, Long Term
Contracts are relatively more preferable than other governance forms and the difference in
preference are higher when this governance form is compared with hierarchical controls than when
it is compared with Neoclassical contracts.
Insert Table 3
With respect to the slopes, estimated aij, the theoretical predictions are confirmed at least for the
variables “Multiple” and “Diversification”. For them, the estimated aij are both positive and
significant and furthermore ai2 > ai1 as the theory predicts. In other words, as complexity increases
when we move from one collaboration that has only one activity to another with multiple activities,
the likelihood of choosing a non classical contracting form increases but it increases more rapidly
in the case of governance forms with hierarchical controls than in the case of Neoclassical
contracting (5.14 > 2.5, t value of 5.77). The same evidence is obtained when complexity is the
result of the higher uncertainty attributed to diversification versus expansion, although the
difference between the two estimated values of aij is now lower (4.34 > 2.16, t value of 1.38).
Combining the relationship between intercepts and slopes, we can explain the thresholds of Figure
1 already identified by the ordered logit.
But Table 3 also points out that the variables number of partners and R&D deviate from the
predictions of the transactions costs analysis. Number of partners has a positive and significant
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coefficient, but it is the same for the two non-classical governance forms, 0.51 and 0.51 (t value of
0.01). Therefore, number of partners increases the attractiveness of forms different from classical
contracting but does not differently for each of them. With respect to R&D, collaborations with
technological activities have higher likelihood of being governed by Neoclassical contracts and
lower likelihood of incorporating hierarchical controls. These result are not inconsistent with those
of the ordered logit but just indicate that the effect of the variable in the likelihood function is not
monotonic and can only be captured with more flexible models such as the multinomial logit.
More important, the negative coefficient of the R&D variable in the governance forms with
hierarchical controls is difficult to justify from the argument of transaction costs. However, the
result is consistent with the prediction from the property rights approach assuming that in
technological activities there are person embodied specific human capital investments. The theory
predicts that separated ownership of physical assets, as it is the case in any form of contracting, is
more efficient than some form of “joint ownership” that is present with cross-shareholdings and
joint ventures. Therefore, we find evidences in favor of hypothesis 2 formulated from the theory of
the boundaries of the firm based in the property rights approach.
Another interest of our analysis is to investigate whether the choice of the governance forms may
be affected by market power reasons besides efficiency ones. The estimated coefficient of the
variable horizontal is positive and significant for the two non-Classical contracting forms, but is
higher (1.31 > 0.63, t value 2.07) in the case of Neoclassical contracts. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is
not confirmed by our data since to move from collaborations among vertically related firms to
collaborations among horizontally related ones, does not increase more the likelihood of
introducing equity interests in the collaborations than the likelihood of non introducing them,
especially when we compare with Neoclassical contracting.
The conditions that affect the viability of implicit contracts also seem to influence the choice of the
governance form. For a given level of transaction complexity, the preferred governance form in
collaborations where both partners are Spanish is Neoclassical contract. This governance form is
the most vulnerable one to ex-post opportunism as the contract only provides guidelines for the
relation (compared wit the more binding Long Term Contract), and there no control rights from
ownership or hierarchy. Firms seem to be more reluctant to choose Neoclassical contracts with
partners from other countries, specially if they are from outside Europe, which would be consistent
with our prediction that cultural, social and physical proximity are conditions which restrict
opportunistic behavior because it is more likely to have social pressure from norms, and reputation
is more valuable. Assuming that a partner from another European country has more “proximity” to
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Spanish firms than from the rest of the world, the evidence that the likelihood of hierarchical
controls is higher when there are European partners than otherwise, contradicts, however,
hypothesis 4a. This may point out towards more complex relations between implicit contracts and
hierarchical controls than their view as substitutes postulated from the transaction cost approach.
The two columns of the second model of Table 3 look precisely to the issue of possible
complementarities between implicit contracts and joint ownership. The model estimated now
includes the interactive variable Spanish-R&D to capture those collaborations where Spanish firms
perform technological activities, i.e. collaborations where it is more likely to have favorable
conditions for reputation effects and where there may be person embodied specific human capital.
The estimated coefficients for the rest of the variables of the model practically remain the same,
and the coefficient of the new interactive variable is positive and significant in both, Neoclassical
contract and Hierarchical forms. It appears that reputation effects and technological activities
increase the likelihood of both non-Classical contracting forms, compared with the likelihood of
Classical contracting, but notice that in the forms that imply joint ownership the estimated
coefficient is higher. So evidence is found in favor of hypothesis 4b.
The results of Table 3 also confirm the sector and time effects already found in the ordered logit
model. Neoclassical contracts are less likely among manufacturing firms, while Electricity firms
tend to use less hierarchical forms. On the other hand, the use of Hierarchical forms appears to be
declining over time. The explanation of these results would require further theoretical
developments.
The estimations of Table 3 have been subject to robustness test. It may be argued that Cross-
shareholdings do not imply a form of joint ownership and therefore should not be included together
with Joint venture. Moreover, the hierarchical controls of the two forms are likely to be different.
One way of testing the sensibility of the results to the treatment of shared ownership in Table 3
would be to separate Cross-shareholdings as an independent governance form, but this creates more
estimation problems since in some of the variables, number of partners, for example, we do not
have variability. Other possibility is to eliminate Cross-shareholdings from the sample; after all,
Cross-shareholdings may be a control mechanism set up by collaborating firms which may shelter
other forms of collaborations, alliances, joint ventures, exchanges. If we re-estimate the model
without the Cross-shareholdings, the basic results of Table 3 remain unchanged. Finally, it would
be argued that from the property rights perspective, we should compare all forms of separate
ownership with all forms of share ownership. To carry out this comparison, a logit model was
estimated coding the value of 0 to collaborations identified as exchanges and alliances, and the
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value if 1 to the collaborations with Share Ownership. The estimated coefficient of Spanish – R&D
continues to be positive and consistent with the results reported in the paper.
Due to the lack of information, to test the robustness of the results to the inclusion of firm’s
variables, such as size, R&D expenditures,..., has not been possible. However, as Oxley (1997) and
Gulati and Singh (1998) find the inclusion of firms’ characteristics in the models does not seem to
alter the basic results.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The proliferation of different governance forms in interfirm collaborations expands the interest in
explaining the boundaries of the firm beyond the categories of markets, hierarchies, hybrids and
networks. Several papers have been published, reviewed in previous sections of the paper, to
explain why certain forms of governance may be preferred to the others, and the conclusions point
towards the advantages of hierarchical controls, in terms of lower transaction costs, over explicit
contracts when collaborations involve intense interdependencies and appropriability hazards, and
when implicit or relational contracts are not feasible. The potential costs of the hierarchy have been
generally ignored, probably because the transaction costs literature has not spelled them out
properly beyond generic references to “bureaucratic costs”. In fact, it would be difficult to find in
the literature on interfirm collaborations arguments why we do not generally observe hierarchical
controls (minority shareholdings for example) among firms involved in collaborations (alliances,
exchanges...) so that selective hierarchical interventions are applied when needed. The stand-by
controls should not harm the relations when not activated and would contribute to efficiency if
activated as initially unforeseen circumstances make them desirable.
This paper has been written with the purpose to integrate the property rights theory about the
boundaries of the firm, with explaining the choice of a governance form in interfirm collaborations.
We believe that this theory clarifies the costs of introducing what have been called hierarchical
controls, and that under the property rights approach they in fact imply different forms of
ownership with respect to governance forms that rely only in contracts. Our underlying conjecture
along the paper has been that the governance forms incorporating hierarchical controls, joint
ventures and cross-shareholdings, are in fact forms of “joint ownership” (any party has veto power
on the use of the non-human assets employed in the collaboration). Therefore, to introduce the so-
called “hierarchical controls” is in fact to move from “separated ownership”, when collaborations
are governed by contracts, to “joint ownership”. The property rights approach identifies the
implications for dynamic efficiency (incentives for investments that increase value before the
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transaction) of the choice of the ownership forms. In fact, the basic model predicts that joint
ownership should not be selected when separated ownership and/or single ownership are also
feasible alternatives. The challenge posed by the empirical evidence on collaboration to the
property rights approach, comes from the fact that joint ownership forms are widely used.
The empirical analysis performed in this paper finds evidence that the costs of joint ownership may
be superior to the benefits of hierarchical controls in collaborations which involve technical
activities, R&D, and the conditions which make inefficient joint ownership of the non-human
assets (person embodied specific human capital), may be present. So far, the empirical evidence
(Pisano, 1989; Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998) indicated that the likelihood of
introducing hierarchical controls increased in collaborations having to do with technological
activities, compared with non technological ones. More detailed and insightful information about
the actual characteristics of the R&D collaborations could be needed to explain the different
empirical evidence obtained from our sample, but it may just be that technological activities are
sufficiently heterogeneous so that in some cases the benefits of hierarchical controls outperform the
costs of joint ownership and in others the costs are higher than the benefits. This conclusion would
also be consistent with the arguments of Holmstrom (1999) and Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) in
the sense that the property rights approach is not sufficient to explain the boundaries of firms, and it
has to be complemented with contributions from the theories of incentives design and efficient
coordination.
Another important result of the paper, also new in the literature, is that we find evidence of
complementarities between conditions which favor reputation effects and the use of hierarchical
controls, although the reason would be that such reputation effects increase the benefits of joint
ownership compared with separated or single ownership, relatively to the benefits when they are
absent (the transaction takes place only once). So the general presumption that “trust”, as an
explanation of why agents rely on implicit contracts, substitute hierarchical controls, should be
clarified. The fact that reputation effects may both reduce the need of hierarchical controls (in terms
of incentives design and coordination efforts) and increase the relative benefits of joint ownership,
introduces more ambiguity on the prediction about which governance form to choose, with equity
interests or without them, in the presence of reputation effects.
The paper, we believe, makes also a methodological contribution to the literature on the selection
of governance forms for collaborations, since it clarifies the relation between the results of the
ordered logit model and of the multinomial logit model. This clarification seems important since
Oxley (1997), for example, uses the ordered logit model but does not even report the estimated
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threshold value of the variable which determines the choice of the governance form. However, such
threshold is the cornerstone of the theory, as our Figure 2 makes clear. Moreover, our interpretation
of the variable which determines the choice of governance in terms of complexity of the transaction
as this complexity falls within certain limits, thresholds values, it is more consistent with the theory
that the interpretation given in Oxley (1997, p. 401). Secondly, we establish a detailed link between
the coefficients estimated in the multinomial logit model and the ordered logit results. Such link is
possible because these coefficients can be related to the differences in fixed costs and in variable
costs of governance, across governance forms, as a function of any variable that makes the
transaction more or less complex in the terms established in the paper.
As it is generally the case in previous literature and hypothesized in the theory section, the paper
also finds evidence that the cultural and social proximity of the partners, measured by their
geographical origin, may influence the choice of the governance form. Proximity favors in general
Neoclassical contracting, i.e. the intermediate form between Classical (Long-Term) contracts and
hierarchical controls. Therefore, collaborating firms may perceive Classical contracts and the
presence of equity interests as governance forms which provide more protection against ex-post
opportunism than Neoclassical contracts, and they will be preferred when partners are more
“distant” so implicit contracts are less feasible.
This result, together with others, for example, the fact that equity interests are more likely than
Classical contracts but less likely than Neoclassical ones when firms are horizontally related,
suggests the relevance of disaggregating contracts in two (or more) categories. Comparing a single
category of contract with governance forms including equity interests, we would find that equity
interests are more likely when collaboration is among horizontally related firms and, according to
our hypothesis, conclude that there may be collusion interests behind interfirm collaborations.
When Classical and Neoclassical contracts are distinguished, such conclusion does not emerge.
Our paper and the results obtained, although encouraging in terms of opening new avenues for
empirical work on the boundaries of the firm, have limitations due mainly to the nature of the data.
The information about the collaborations is quite limited both in terms of the actual features of the
selected governance form and in terms of the attributes which are identified as sources of
complexity in the transaction. We would have benefited from a more detailed description of the
terms of the contracts to make sure that the coding of the dependent variable was the correct one.
This difficulty is often recognized in the literature, Oxley (1997, p. 391), but nevertheless it is
important to recall it and introduce some caution in the conclusions. Information was also limited
on the type of technological activities and in particular whether they really involved person
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embodied specific human capital. To have this detailed information, as well as the degree of
complementarity between human and non-human assets involved in the collaboration, it will be
critical to be able to progress in empirical analysis of the property rights predictions. We hope that
the preliminary evidences presented in this paper will encourage future efforts to collect these data
and verify the robustness of the results.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables.
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Number of partners (mean) 2.27 0.94 2 16
Cooperation range (%) 0.527 0.5 0 1
1. Multiple activities
0. One activity
Kind of activity (%) 0.082 0.27 0 1
1. R+D
0. Other kind
Nature (%) 0.609 0.49 0 1
1. Horizontal
0. Vertical
Purpose (%) 0.07 0.25 0 1
1. Diversification
0. Other
Nacionality (%) 0.652 0.48 0 1
1. International
0. National
Sector (%)
Manufacturing (dummy) 0.436 0.50 0 1
General services (dummy) 0.265 0.44 0 1
Energy (dummy) 0.112 0.32 0 1
Construction (dummy) 0.069 0.25 0 1
Finance services (dummy) 0.118 0.32 0 1
Partner’s country
Europe (dummy) 0.405 0.491 0 1
USA (dummy) 0.103 0.304 0 1
Japan (dummy) 0.034 0.183 0 1
Other (dummy) 0.456 0.498 0 1
Total collaborations 1148
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Table 2. Ordered Logit Estimation of the Choice of Governance.
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept. -0.44775**
(0.19514)
-0.76107**
(0.38380)
Nº partners 0.11299
(0.78897E-01)
0.86489E-01
(0.84830E-01)
Multiple 3.5044***
(0.16573)
3.5683***
(0.17632)
R+D 0.52309**
(0.25124)
0.55994**
(0.25094)
Diversification 2.1279***
(0.46526)
2.3986***
(0.47620)
Horizontal 0.41458***
(0.14597)
Spanish 0.27627E-01
(0.22904)
Europe 0.37750*
(0.22256)
USA -0.40945
(0.28502)
Japan 0.23452
(0.38883)
Manufacturing -0.34588
(0.21862)
Construction 0.15029E-01
(0.24332)
Energy -0.81374***
(0.26971)
Gnral. Services -0.77157**
(0.30925)
Data90 0.52688***
(0.15886)
Data91 0.36143**
(0.16182)
MU(1) 2.5476***
(0.13570)
2.6503***
(0.13970)
Log. Likelihood -885.6349 -852.6389
Chi square. 709.5562*** 775.5482***
Percentage correct classification 64.8% 66.63%
Standard Error in parenthesis.
*Significance < 0.1; ** Significance < 0.05; ***Significance < 0.01.
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimation of the Choice of Governance.
Alliance Joint venture –Cross
shareholdings
Alliance Joint venture –Cross
shareholdings
Intercept -2.4017***
(0.63206)
-4.2256***
(0.73369)
-2.3870***
(0.63723)
-4.2234***
(0.73981)
Nº partners 0.51583***
(0.19420)
0.51923**
(0.20334)
0.54326***
(0.19848)
0.54672***
(0.2075)
Multiple 2.5029***
(0.31307)
5.1406***
(0.33287)
2.4637***
(0.31237)
5.1166***
(0.33196)
R+D 1.0269***
(0.27512)
-1.3540*
(0.70703)
0.28192
(0.32978)
-2.6932**
(1.1236)
Diversification 2.1697**
(1.0928)
4.3480***
(1.1347)
2.0183*
(1.1106)
4.1415***
(1.1422)
Horizontal 1.312***
(0.21442)
0.63020**
(0.24799)
1.4202***
(0.21995)
0.70958***
(0.25066)
Spanish 1.1482***
(0.36132)
0.60872
(0.41303)
0.87867**
(0.36733)
0.37770
(0.41682)
Europe 0.64788*
(0.34792)
1.0296***
(0.39552)
0.65997*
(0.34714)
1.0509***
(0.39716)
USA 0.47468E-01
(0.42847)
0.17438
(0.50061)
0.85475E-01
(0.42740)
0.19522
(0.50204)
Japan 0.12250
(0.63599)
0.77240
(0.68677)
0.24290
(0.62801)
0.87603
(0.68857)
Manufacturing -1.6333***
(0.32403)
-0.43285
(0.38995)
-1.6766***
(0.32684)
-0.47242
(0.39295)
Construction -0.28044
(0.35296)
0.92721E-01
(0.42069)
-0.31080
(0.35632)
0.71995E-01
(0.42405)
Energy -0.64690
(0.39997)
-1.4997***
(0.49656)
-0.55857
(0.40407)
-1.4160***
(0.50083)
Gnral. Services 1.1349
(0.82259)
0.55134
(0.87064)
1.1882
(0.82892)
0.60150
(0.87738)
Data90 0.42867*
(0.23815)
0.96341***
(0.28187)
0.39667
(0.24174)
0.94437***
(0.28419)
Data91 0.38318
(0.23856)
0.60610**
(0.28497)
0.35872
(0.24159)
0.58309**
(0.28676)
R&D – Spanish 2.4489***
(0.67906)
3.5564**
(1.4725)
Log. Likelihood -753.9903 -745.4062
Chi square 972.8455*** 990.0137***
Percentage correct classification 71.95% 71.95%
Standard error in parenthesis.
*Significance < 0.1; ** Significance < 0.05; ***Significance < 0.01.
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NOTES:
                                                
1 In this paper the word “collaboration” is preferred to “cooperation” because the later suggests the convergence of
objectives among firms participating in the exchange or production and therefore the absence of conflicts of interests.
The fact that firms collaborate does not imply that each one changes its proper objectives and interests and assume
collective ones. The term “alliance” also widely used to refer to any form of collaboration, as in Gulati and Singh
(1998, p. 781), is used in this paper to identify a subset of collaboration forms.
2 See for example the issue of the Journal of Economics Studies, January (1999).
3 There have been several papers discussing the advantages and disadvantages of balanced joint ventures versus non-
balanced one’s (see Kogut (1988) for a good classification). But no references have been made to the costs and benefits
of ownership as considered in the property right approach.
4 A detailed comparison between Classical and Neoclassical contracting is found in Mcneil (1974, 1978). See also
Williamson (1991, p. 271-273; 1985, p. 70-72).
5 To ignore two of the possible alternatives, spot contracting and merger or internal development, when explaining the
choice of governance forms in collaboration, may in fact bias the results. In any case, the literature on the determinants
of “vertical integration” is very large. Worth to mention because of its proximity to interfirm collaboration, is the study
of vertical integration in the context of the theory of the multinational firm; Gatignon and Anderson (1988) is an
excellent example of the work in this field.
6 The expression L’x means the derivative of the function L(x) with respect to the variable x.
7 Linearity of the variable costs functions is assumed for simplicity and without loss of generality.
8 “Compensation due to clients” saves commerce agents. It is supposed that the agent creates some clients for the
exporter and, for creating them, they must receive non-surrender compensation.
9 The result is the same if number of partners is treated as a dummy variable with 0 for two partners and 1 for more than
two.
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